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J21We quantify the contribution of labor market reforms to unemployment dynamics in nine OECD countries
(Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, US). We estimate a dynamic stochastic
search-matching model with heterogeneous workers and aggregate productivity shocks. The heterogeneous-
worker mechanism proposed by Robin (2011) explains unemployment volatility by productivity shocks well
in all countries. Placement and employment services, UI beneﬁt reduction and product market deregulation
are found to be the most prominent policy levers for unemployment reduction. Business cycle shocks and
LMPs explain about the same share of unemployment volatility (except for Japan, Portugal and the US).
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A large number of studies have sought the source of persistent differ-
ences in European andAmerican labormarket outcomes in different labor
market institutions. Following Bruno and Sachs (1985), research looked
for the most effective labor market policies by running pooled cross-
country time-series regressions of unemployment rates on various
macroeconomic indicators (like GDP growth) and a battery of labor
market institutional indices (see British Nickell and Layard, 1999, for a
survey). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola et al. (2007) thus
showed that different policy mixes induce different responses of unem-
ployment to world-wide shocks (like an oil shock) and country-speciﬁclead by the OECD (2011) and
erres. We thank Romain Duval,
rtensen, Christopher Pissarides,
er, Paul Swaim, as well as the
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J.-M., Labor market reforms aproductivity shocks; and Bassanini and Duval (2009) emphasized the ex-
istence of complementarities between labormarket policies. In parallel, in
order to understand the mechanisms of these interactions, research
spawned a collection of small dynamic stochastic equilibriummodels fo-
cussing on one particular labor market policy at a time. For example, the
inﬂuential work of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) emphasized the link
between long-term unemployment and welfare policies, while Prescott
(2004) and Rogerson (2008) emphasized the role of labor taxes.
In this paper we will try to incorporate the rich reduced forms of the
former approach into a small equilibrium model of the latter kind. The
idea is to identify a small set of parameters of the dynamic equilibrium
model governing the responses to aggregate shocks of unemployment
and turnover, and channeling a wide range of labor market policies at
the same time. The number of policies simultaneously examined is poten-
tially large, yet the number of parameters throughwhich they impact the
economy should be kept small for the model to be identiﬁed. Identiﬁca-
tion is indeed likely to fail if the number of intervention channels is
greater than the number of independent series used in the analysis.
Speciﬁcally, if we use series of unemployment stocks and ﬂows, and
vacancies, as labor market variables, it will be difﬁcult to identify more
than three separate channels for policy intervention.11 The change inunemployment is the difference between the inﬂowand the outﬂow. So
stocks and ﬂows are not independent series.
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Table 1
Unemployment and turnover cycle - descriptive statistics.
Period Unemployment Job destruction rate Job ﬁnding rate
Mean Std Std Mean Std Mean Std
Trend Cycle Trend Cycle Trend Cycle
Australia 1979Q1–2009Q4 5.69 2.62 1.19 1.10 3.78 0.36 0.23 47.74 6.62 5.69
Germany 1984Q1–2010Q1 6.09 2.72 1.27 1.06 1.81 0.06 0.52 18.71 0.88 2.71
Spain 1978Q1–2010Q2 12.76 4.10 1.94 2.78 3.88 0.73 0.16 21.67 8.04 5.55
France 1976Q1–2010Q1 6.18 3.33 1.58 0.77 2.41 0.43 0.16 22.59 3.64 2.78
UK 1967Q2–2010Q1 6.25 2.74 1.86 1.29 3.06 0.48 0.60 43.87 15.22 5.35
Japan 1978Q1–2007Q4 2.65 1.31 0.92 0.49 1.51 0.27 0.22 42.78 4.21 4.83
Portugal 1987Q1–2010Q2 5.70 2.29 0.84 1.22 1.45 0.20 0.42 20.58 0.99 3.55
Sweden 1972Q1–2010Q1 4.81 3.03 2.20 1.85 2.84 0.75 0.27 56.06 10.14 6.31
US 1960Q1–2010Q2 5.95 1.54 0.75 1.14 4.82 0.68 0.66 76.59 6.03 5.21
Notes: All ﬁgures are in percent. Series were detrended using the HP-ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105.
2 F. Murtin, J.-M. Robin / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxWe develop a dynamic stochastic search-matching model with
heterogeneous workers, where aggregate shocks to productivity fuel up
the cycle, and unanticipated policy interventions displace the stationary
stochastic equilibrium by shifting structural turnover parameters. This
model is estimated for nine different countries (Australia, France,
Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States), over the period 1985–2007, in two ways. First, a version
without policy interventions is estimated on detrended series by the
Simulated Method of Moments. Second, policy effects are introduced
into the model, and estimated by minimizing the sum of squared
residuals for the series of actual unemployment rates (i.e. trend
plus cycle), unemployment ﬂows and job vacancies.
Themodel builds onMortensen andPissarides (1994, henceforthMP).
Yet, it is immune to Shimer's (2005) critique. Shimer showed that in the
MP model Nash bargaining converts most of the cyclical volatility of
aggregate productivity into wage volatility, leaving little room for change
to the key variable driving unemployment, market tightness. In the same
AER issue, Hall (2005) presented a calibration showing that the unem-
ployment volatility puzzle could indeedbe solved bywage rigidity.2How-
ever, his argument was recently contested by Pissarides (2009), who
presented empirical evidence that the volatility of wages in new jobs,
those that proceed fromnewvacancies, is large compared to the volatility
of ongoing wages. Finally, Hagedorn and Manovskii's (2008) solution to
the puzzle does not require wage rigidity but assumes a very large
value of non-market time (some 95% of productivity).
Our model extends the model of Robin (2011) by endogenizing
labor demand through a matching function and vacancy creation. It
has two main ingredients that make it distinct from the MP model,
namely heterogenous worker abilities3 and a different wage setting
mechanism. First, workers differ in ability. In good states of the economy,
all matches are proﬁtable and all workers are employable. In bad states,
low-skill workers fail to generate positive surplus and are thus laid off
or stay unemployed longer.With a thick left tail of the ability distribution,
small adverse shocks to the economy lead a disproportionately high
number of low-skill workers into the negative surplus region and into
unemployment. We show that this ampliﬁcation mechanism ﬁts unem-
ployment volatility well in all nine major OECD countries used in the
empirical analysis.
We also assume that wage contracts are long term contracts that
can only be renegotiated by mutual agreement (see Postel-Vinay and
Robin, 2002). Wage renegotiation is either induced by on-the-job search
and Bertrand competition between employers, or by aggregate shocks
big enough to threaten match disruption. As a consequence, wages in
new jobs are more volatile than ongoing wages.4 This assumption also2 See also Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009).
3 In this simple version of themodel,we abstract fromﬁrmheterogeneity in production.
For an extension of the model with heterogeneous ﬁrms, see Lise and Robin (2013).
4 Hall and Krueger (2012) emphasize the empirical relevance of on-the-job search to
explain wage formation.
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10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.025simpliﬁes the form of the Bellman equation deﬁning the surplus of
amatchwith aworker of a given type in a given state of the economy,
and it thus makes the dynamic stochastic equilibrium very easy to
solve.
We use our model to assess the impact of labor market reforms on
the actual (i.e. not American detrended) rate of unemployment by
way of counterfactual simulations. We ﬁnd that placement services,
unemployment beneﬁts and productmarket regulation are themain pol-
icy tools signiﬁcantly inﬂuencing unemployment over the 1985–2007
period. These by all means classical policies are accountable for close to
one, or more than one percentage point change in unemployment. The
other policies yielded, on average, only between 20% and a third of a
percentage point. Speciﬁcally, Australia and France reduced (or prevented
a rise of) unemployment by increasing expenditure on placement
services and deregulating product markets. Germany deregulated. Spain
massively reduced unemployment beneﬁts, deregulated and reduced
employment protection. The UK reduced unemployment beneﬁt,
improved placement services and deregulated. The only countries
implementing unemployment-augmenting policies are countries
with low unemployment rates and hit by a deep and long-lasting
recession at the end of the eighties or the beginning of the nineties.
Thus, Japan and Sweden massively reduced ALMP expenditure. Lastly,
Portugal and the US made no noticeable classical policy intervention.
We do not ﬁnd evidence of policy complementarity, as the sum of indi-
vidual effects is similar in value to the Difference-in-Difference effect of
the policy mix. Finally, we measure the relative contribution of LMPs
and business cycle shocks to the long term variance of unemployment.
In general, both contribute to about half of the total variance, with some
exceptions: in Japan, business cycle shocks do not explain much unem-
ployment volatility, and in Portugal and the US labor market policies
seem to have little impact.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a dynamic sequential-
auction model with heterogeneous workers and identical ﬁrms is devel-
oped. Section3 describes the data and Section4 the estimationprocedure.
In Section 5, the business cycle version of the model is estimated on nine
OECD countries. In Section 6, labor market policy effects are estimated.
The last section concludes.2. The model
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ ℕ. The global state of the
economy is an ergodic Markov chain yt ∈ {y1 b ... b yN} with transition
matrixΠ= (πij). We use yt to denote the random variable and yi or yj
to denote one of the N possible realizations. There are M types of
workers and ‘mworkers of each type, with ‘1 + ... + ‘M=1.Workers
of type m have ability xm and xm b xm + 1. All ﬁrms are identical.
Workers and ﬁrm are paired into productive units. The per-period
output of a worker of ability xm when aggregate productivity is yi is
denoted as yi(m).nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 1. Unemployment rate and turnover - trends and cycles.
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Fig. 2. Labor market institutions - 1985–2007.
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Table 2
Labor market institutions - correlated change in 1985–2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Initial replacement rate 1.000
(2) ALMP: Placement −0.042 1.000
(3) ALMP: Training 0.568 0.488 1.000
(4) ALMP: Incentives 0.557 0.572 0.944 1.000
(5) Product market regulation 0.224 0.046 0.409 0.303 1.000
(6) Employment protection 0.196 0.067 −0.077 −0.049 0.170 1.000
(7) Tax wedge 0.047 −0.451 −0.356 −0.391 −0.393 0.037 1.000
Note: Correlations of deviations of LMPs from country-speciﬁc means.
5F. Murtin, J.-M. Robin / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxx2.1. Turnover and unemployment
Matches form and break at the beginning of each period. Let ut(m)
denote the proportion of unemployed in the population of workers
of ability xm at the end of period t, or at the beginning of period t,
just before revelation of the aggregate shock for period t, and let
ut = ut(1)‘1 + ... + ut(M)‘M deﬁne the aggregate unemployment
rate. Let St(m) denote the surplus of a match with a worker of type
xm at time t, that is, the present value of the match minus the value
of unemployment and minus the value of a vacancy (assumed to be
nil). Only matches with positive surplus St(m) ≥ 0 are viable.
At the beginning of period t, yt is realized and a new value St(m) is
observed for the match surplus. An endogenous fraction
1{St(m) b 0}[1−ut(m)]‘m of employed workers is immediately laid off
if the match surplus becomes negative, and another fraction
δ1{St(m) ≥ 0}[1−ut(m)]‘m is otherwise destroyed. In addition, a frac-
tion λt1{St(m) ≥ 0}ut(m)‘m of employable unemployed workers meet
with a vacancy. Finally, we also allow employees tomeetwith alternative
employers, and move or negotiate wage increases (more on this later).
Aggregate shocks thus determine unemployment by conditioning job
destruction and the duration of unemployment. The law of motion for
individual-speciﬁc unemployment rates is ut + 1(m) = if St(m) b 0, and
utþ1 mð Þ ¼ ut mð Þ þ δ 1−ut mð Þð Þ−λtut mð Þ;
if St(m) ≥ 0. The dynamics of unemployment by worker type depends on
the dynamics of the whole match surplus, not on how the surplus is split
between the employer and the worker.Table 3
Estimates of Business Cycle Parameters.
AUS FRA DEU JAP
Productivity (y)
ρ 0.970 0.938 0.933 0.942
σ 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.025
Worker heterogeneity (x)
Minimum (C) 0.701 0.679 0.527 0.514
μ 3.658 4.624 3.288 2.126
v 1.511 2.090 2.727 1.870
Mean (C þ νμþν) 0.993 0.990 0.980 0.982
Mode (C þ ν−1μþν−1) 0.824 0.870 0.871 0.804
Std ( μνðμþνÞðμþνþ1Þ) 0.416 0.432 0.461 0.446
Unemployment beneﬁt
z 0.716 0.716 0.683 0.565
Vacancy cost
c0 20.14 21.99 12.11 17.95
Matching function
Efﬁciency (ϕ0) 2.195 1.268 1.244 1.868
Elasticity (η) 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Job destruction rate
δ0 0.038 0.023 0.017 0.014
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10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.025Deﬁne the exit rate from unemployment (or job ﬁnding rate) as the
product of the meeting rate and the share of employable unemployed
workers,
f t ¼ λt
X
m
ut mð Þ‘m1 St mð Þ≥0f g
ut
: ð1Þ
Deﬁne also the job destruction rate as the sum of the exogenous and
the endogenous layoff rates,
st ¼ δþ 1−δð Þ
X
m
1−ut mð Þð Þ‘m1 St mð Þ b 0f g
1−ut
: ð2Þ
Aggregate unemployment then satisﬁes the usual recursion:
utþ1 ¼ ut þ st 1−utð Þ− f tut :
It is important to stress here that both the job ﬁnding rate ft and
the job destruction rate st mix structural parameters (in λt and δ)
with endogenous variables: the share of employable unemployed
workers (∑m1fSt ðmÞ≥0gut ðmÞ‘mut ) and the share of unemployable employed
workers (∑m1fSt ðmÞb0gð1−utðmÞÞ‘m1−ut ). For that reason, standard least-
squares estimates of matching functions or layoff rates will not provide
consistent estimators.PRT ESP SWE GBR USA
0.842 0.972 0.961 0.970 0.959
0.026 0.026 0.029 0.023 0.015
0.826 0.705 0.700 0.695 0.663
5.691 4.625 4.039 4.417 3.859
1.187 1.723 1.606 1.821 1.898
0.999 0.976 0.984 0.987 0.993
0.858 0.840 0.830 0.852 0.852
0.353 0.413 0.416 0.422 0.434
0.834 0.745 0.728 0.721 0.693
38.13 36.94 16.13 16.72 5.07
1.963 1.801 2.611 1.871 1.698
0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
0.013 0.036 0.024 0.029 0.043
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
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Weassume that employers have fullmonopsonypowerwith respect
to unemployed workers. They keep the whole surplus in this case and
unemployed workers leave unemployment with a wage that is only
marginally greater than their reservation wage. The assumption that
unemployedworkers have zero bargaining power relative to employers
is mainly technical: it makes the dynamics of unemployment indepen-
dent of wages. As the focus of this paper is on unemployment dynamics
and worker ﬂows, we believe that this decoupling is justiﬁed. Note
however that we could easily allow for Nash bargaining between
unemployed workers and ﬁrms, but this would complicate the model a
lot for a marginal gain.5
Employed workers search on the job. When the search for an
alternative employer is successful, we assume that Bertrand competition
between the incumbent and the poacher transfers the entire surplus to
the worker. The worker is indifferent between staying and moving. We
assume that job-to-jobmobility is then decided by coin tossing. Employer
heterogeneity would eliminate this indeterminacy, at the cost of great
additional complexity (see Lise and Robin, 2013, for an extension of this
model with two-sided heterogeneity).
2.3. Vacancy creation and market tightness
Firms post vacancies vt until ex ante proﬁts are exhausted. The total
vacancy cost is cvt. Vacancies can either randomly meet with an unem-
ployedworker or with an employedworker. However, only themeetings
with unemployed workers generate a proﬁt to the ﬁrm. Free entry then
ensures that
cvt ¼ λt
XM
m¼1
ut mð Þ‘mSt mð Þþ; ð3Þ
where we denote x+ =max(x,0).
Deﬁne market tightness as the ratio of vacancies and workers'
aggregate search intensity,
θt ¼ vtut þ k 1−utð Þ ; ð4Þ
where k is the relative search intensity of employees with respect to
unemployed.6 The meeting rate λt is related to market tightness via
the meeting function, λt = f(θt), where f is an increasing function,
likely concave.
2.4. The value of unemployment and the match surplus
LetUi(m) denote the present value of remaining unemployed for the
rest of period t for aworker of typem if the economy is in state i. It solves
the following linear Bellman equation:
Ui mð Þ ¼ zi mð Þ þ
1
1þ r
X
j
πijU j mð Þ: ð5Þ
This equation can be understood as follows. An unemployed worker
receives a ﬂow-payment zi(m) for the period. At the beginning of the
next period, the state of the economy changes to yj with probability πij
and the worker receives a job offer with some probability. We have
assumed that employers offer unemployed workers their reservation5 We state the model with on-the-job search. However, in this paper, contrary to Robin
(2011), we shall not use wages in the empirical part. What really matters to solve the vola-
tility puzzle is worker heterogenous productivities, which acts an ampliﬁcation mechanism
for aggregate shocks. We could as well use a standard Mortensen-Pissarides setup and rule
out on-the-job search without changing much of the results.
6 We use k = 0.12 as in Robin (2011) but imposing a zero search intensity for
employees has little inﬂuence on the estimation outcome. Ta
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Table 5
Correlation between actual and predicted detrended series.
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Average
Productivity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Unemployment 0.83 0.68 0.88 0.87 0.73 0.92 0.77 0.87 0.75 0.81
Job ﬁnding rate 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.79 0.74 0.77 0.31 0.85 0.82 0.70
Job destruction rate 0.16 0.03 0.32 0.02 −0.06 0.20 0.36 0.23 0.34 0.18
Market tightness 0.71 0.63 0.38 0.51 0.83 0.84 0.43 0.67 0.65 0.63
7F. Murtin, J.-M. Robin / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxwage on a take-it-or-leave basis, thus effectively reaping the whole
surplus. As a consequence, the present value of a new job to the worker
is only marginally better than the value of unemployment. Hence, the
continuation value is the value of unemployment in the new state j
whether the workers remains unemployed or not.
Let us now turn to thematch surplus. After a productivity shock from
i to j all matches yielding negative surplus are destroyed. Then, either
on‐the‐job search is unsuccessful, and the match surplus only changes
because the macroeconomic environment changes; or the worker is
poached and Bertrand competition gives the whole match surplus to
the worker, whether she moves or not. As everything that the worker
expects to earn in the future contributes to the deﬁnition of the current
surplus, the surplus of a match with a worker of typemwhen the econo-
my is in state i thus solves the following (almost linear) Bellmanequation:
Si mð Þ ¼ yi mð Þ−zi mð Þ þ
1−δ
1þ r
X
j
πijS j mð Þþ: ð6Þ
This almost-linear system of equations can be solved numerically by
value function iteration. As for the unemployment value, the match
surplus only depends on the state of the economy.
2.5. Parameterization and functional forms
2.5.1. Unemployment exit rate and the matching function
Themeeting rate, and hence the unemployment exit rate, are related
to market tightness θt via a Cobb-Douglas matching technology:
λt ¼ f θð Þ ¼ ϕθη: ð7Þ
A standard cross-country OLS regression of job ﬁnding rates on
tightness (in logs) simply deﬁned as v/u delivers estimates of matching
efﬁciencyϕ=0.712 andmatching elasticity n=0.289, in tunewith the
empirical literature (Murtin and de Serres, 2014).
2.5.2. Aggregate shocks
We assume that aggregate productivity follows a Gaussian
AR(1) process:
lnyt ¼ ρ lnyt−1 þ σεt ; ð8Þ
where innovations are iid-normal N(0,). Note that the aggregate
productivity shock yt is a latent process that does not a priori coincide
with observed output or output per worker. Indeed, observed output is
the aggregation of match output yt(m) across all active matches, say
Yt ¼
X
m
1−ut mð Þ½  ‘m yt mð Þ; ð9Þ
and is thus endogenous. Therefore, the structural parameters (ρ, σ)
cannot be directly inferred from the observed series of aggregate output.
We discretize the aggregate productivity process yt as follows. Let F
denote the estimated equilibriumdistribution of yt.7 The joint distribution7 That is, with white-noise innovations, lnyt  Nð0; σ21−ρ2Þ.
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the distribution of two random variables with uniform margins). To
discretize the aggregate productivity processes we ﬁrst specify a grid
a1 b ... b aN on [∈,1−∈] ⊂ (0,1) of N linearly spaced points including
end points ϵ and 1 − ϵ. Then we set yi = F−1(ai) and πij ∝ c(ai;aj),
where c denotes the copula density and we impose the normalization
∑ jπij . In practice, we use N = 150, ϵ = 0,002; F is a log-normal CDF
and c is a Gaussian copula density, as implied by the Gaussian
AR(1) speciﬁcation.
2.5.3. Worker heterogeneity
Match productivity is speciﬁed as yi(m) = yi,xm, where (xm, m =
1,…,M) is a grid of M linearly spaced points on the interval [C, C + 1].
The choice of the support does not matter much provided that it is large
enough and contains one. A beta distribution is assumed for the ability
distribution, namely
‘m∝betapdf xm;ν; μð Þ; ð10Þ
with the normalization ∑m‘m ¼1. The beta distribution allows for a
variety of shapes for the density (increasing, decreasing, non-monotone,
concave or convex). We use a very dense grid of M = 500 points to
guarantee a good resolution in the left tail.
2.5.4. Leisure and vacancy costs
The opportunity cost of employment zi(m) (aggregating the utility of
leisure, unemployment insurance andwelfare) is speciﬁed as a constant z.
2.5.5. Labor market institutions
Because of the feed-back effects implied by themodel, it is important
for identiﬁcation that we restrict the channels of policy interventions.
For example, any policy that directly impacts matching efﬁciency (ϕ)
immediately changes the meeting rate (λt) and, subsequently, the
number of created vacancies (vt) via the free entry condition. Both
effects contribute to changing the job ﬁnding rate (ft). If one makes
the cost of posting a vacancy (c) a concurrent intervention channel
for this policy, then the policy affects vacancy creation in two ways,
which evidently reduces the chances that the model be identiﬁed.
Because we only have independent data information on turnover
ﬂows ( ft and st) and vacancies (vt)we decided to introduce labormarket
policies (henceforth LMPs) through only three structural parameters:
matching efﬁciency (ϕ) via Eq. (1), the job destruction rate (δ) via
Eq. (2), and the cost of posting a vacancy (c) via Eq. (3). Formally, we
let parameters ϕ, δ and c in country n at time t be log-linear indices of
country-speciﬁc institutional variables Xnt1 ,...,XntK :
ϕnt ¼ ϕ0n exp ∑kϕ•k X ntkð Þ; δnt ¼ δ0n exp ∑kδ•k X ntkð Þ; cnt ¼ c0n exp ∑kc•k X ntkð Þ:
In these equations, the LMP semi-elasticities (ϕ•k,δ•k,c•k) are common
to all countries. However, intercepts (ϕn0,δn0,cn0) are country-speciﬁc.
This framework thus identiﬁes institutional effects from policy
variations.nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 3. Unemployment cycle - actual (solid line) and simulated (dotted).
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We have assembled data on labor market outcomes and institutions
for nine OECD countries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Unites States, over the period
1985–2007. These data and their sources are described in detail in
the Appendix.
3.1. Unemployment and turnover cycle
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the rate of unemployment
as well as the probability of entering and exiting unemployment. All
series are quarterly. The trend and cyclical components were extracted
by HP-ﬁltering the log-transformed series with a smoothing parameter
equal to 105, as in Shimer (2005), and re-exponentiating. The volatility
of unemployment and of turnover are very different across countries.
Japan displays lower and less volatile unemployment, due to lower jobTable 6
Estimates of policy effects.
ϕ δ c
Initial replacement rate −0.028 0.029
(0.008) (0.009)
ALMP placement and employment services 0.032 −0.101
(0.006) (0.007)
ALMP training −0.038 −0.097
(0.016) (0.019)
ALMP incentives 0.057 −0.161
(0.019) (0.059)
Product market regulation −0.025 0.111
(0.017) (0.062)
Employment protection (regular contracts) −0.043 0.037
(0.008) (0.024)
Tax wedge 0.023 0.037
(0.008) (0.023)
Mean years of higher education −0.014 −0.051
(0.008) (0.009)
Share 15–24 population 0.016 −0.011
(0.010) (0.011)
Share 55–64 population −0.017 −0.036
(0.006) (0.007)
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and higher exit rates from unemployment. France, and Japan to a lesser
extent, display particularly low cyclical volatility in unemployment
turnover.
Interesting patterns emerge from trends (Fig. 1). Unemployment
culminates in the 1980s in the UK and the US, and in the 1990s in
Australia, France, Spain and Sweden. Japan displays a monotonic,
increasing trend throughout the 1960–2010 period. Unemployment
rebounds in the early 2000s in Portugal and the US. Long-term unem-
ployment trends hide strikingly different trends in turnover rates. Job
destruction rates tend to increase in France, Japan, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden, and to decrease in Australia, the UK and the US since the
mid-1980s. Job-ﬁnding rates tend to increase in Australia, France and
Spain, and to decrease in Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US. These
patterns are potentially associated with important labor market reforms
that we now brieﬂy discuss.
3.2. Labor market policies
The set of labormarket policy variables used as potential determinants
of unemployment stocks and ﬂows in the empirical analysis are the
following: i) the replacement rate used to calculate unemployment insur-
ance (UI) beneﬁts at ﬁrst date of reception; ii) public expenditure on
active labormarket policies per unemployedworker (ALMPs) normalized
by GDP per worker, and broken down into three sub-categories (place-
ment and employment services, employment incentives8 and training);
iii) the OECD index of product market regulation; iv) the OECD index of
employment protection for regular contracts; v) the tax wedge (personal
income tax plus payroll taxes and social security contributions). We
exclude from the analysis LMPs such as the legal minimum wage, union
density and other wage bargaining institutions as they mostly affect
wages, which are outside the scope of this paper.
Fig. 2 plots the LMP series for all countries between 1985 and 2007
(the period over which we have gathered a balanced sample of labor
market outcomes). Some institutions show no change in the period
(such as employment protection in theUS). The associatedpolicy effects8 These expenditures include incentives to private employment, direct job creation, job
sharing and start-up incentives.
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 4. Unemployment.
9F. Murtin, J.-M. Robin / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxcannot be identiﬁed in this case. However, in general, LMPs do vary over
time and across countries.
France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden offer high support to the unem-
ployed and high employment protection at the same time, whereas the
US, the UK, Australia and Canada are on the low side, and Germany and
Japan somewhere in-between. Sweden stands alone in its effort to
reduce ALMP spendings. It started the period from a very high point,
considerablymore interventionist than any other country, and convergedFig. 5. Job ﬁnd
Please cite this article as: Murtin, F., Robin, J.-M., Labor market reforms a
10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.025to a more comparable norm. Japan and Sweden used to spend a lot more
than the other countries on placement and labor services. They tend to be
overtakenbyGreat Britain andAustralia, and France to a lesser extent; the
UK spending more (per unit of labor productivity) in 2007 than Sweden.
Product market regulation shows a remarkable convergence toward
deregulation in all countries, with Great Britain, Germany, Australia,
Spain and Sweden progressively becoming more deregulated than the
US. There is some tendency to converge toward a more common modeling rate.
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 6. Job destruction rate.
10 F. Murtin, J.-M. Robin / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxof employment protection among European states, with Portugal and
Spain (particularly) reducing EPL and the UK and Australia increasing
EPL (a bit). There are some variations in labor taxes over time and across
countries, but they consistently remain higher in Sweden, France and
Germany.
Table 2 displays the correlations between the LMP variables centered
around their country-speciﬁc means. The three ALMP components areFig. 7.Market
Please cite this article as: Murtin, F., Robin, J.-M., Labor market reforms a
10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.025strongly correlated, in particular training and ﬁrm incentives. Inter-
estingly, product market deregulation or unemployment insurance
reductions are often accompanied by another policy, such as increased
expenditure on training or employment incentives or wage subsidies,
aiming at reducing social or economic collateral costs. This is much
less the case for employment protection which appears much less
correlated with other LMPs.tightness.
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Table 7
Correlation between actual and predicted unﬁltered series.
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Average
Productivity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Unemployment 0.96 0.79 0.67 0.97 0.75 0.81 0.98 0.89 0.56 0.82
Job ﬁnding rate 0.86 0.90 0.56 0.84 0.37 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.69 0.77
Job destruction rate 0.68 0.27 0.39 0.87 0.41 0.33 0.95 0.54 0.62 0.56
Market tightness 0.94 0.90 0.71 0.81 0.58 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.14 0.76
11F. Murtin, J.-M. Robin / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxx3.3. Intervention mechanisms
As already emphasized, it is important for identiﬁcation to restrict the
channels of policy interventions. Heuristically, in absence of a more
formal model of the mechanisms of policy interventions, we ended
up restricting the mapping between LMPs and structural parameters
in the following way.
A ﬁrst set of policies affect the search-matching technology. More
generous unemployment beneﬁts should reduce unemployed workers'
search intensity.More placement and employment services should help
unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs more easily and improve match quality.
Higher quality matches should in turn be more resilient to exogenous
destruction shocks. More training provided to unemployed workers
should also raise match quality and reduce job destruction. The impact
of training on job ﬁnding rates is yet ambiguous and possibly negative,
as the participation to training programmes may also increase the
duration of unemployment. Therefore, we allow the replacement rate,
the indices for placement and employment services, and training to
determine parameters ϕ and δ (matching efﬁciency and exogenous
job destruction).
Employment incentives (like payroll tax discounts), product market
regulation, and employment protection to some extent, are another
group of policies that operate through similar mechanisms: they
primarily affect job creation and job destruction. Employment incentives
encourage vacancy creation, but they alsomake employers less picky and
thus facilitate the creation of matches of lower quality, which therefore
terminate sooner than later. Less product market regulation fosters
competition between ﬁrms, which is favorable to employment in a way
that can be captured in our model by a reduction in the vacancy cost. At
the same time, more competition between ﬁrms reduces proﬁt margins
and increases the probability of failure, and thus generates more job
destruction. Employment protection renders separation more costly; it
delays job destruction but ﬁrms are alsomore reluctant to post vacancies.
These policies have no obvious impact onmatching efﬁciency. Hence, we
allow employment incentives, employment protection, product market
regulation and the tax wedge to determine parameters c and δ (cost of
vacancy and exogenous job destruction).9
The set of labor market policies is complemented by a handful of
socio-demographic variables, namely the shares of workers aged
15–24 and 55–64 in the 15–64 population, and mean years of higher
education among the 15–64 population. Indeed there is empirical9 Themapping between policies and the structural parameters throughwhichpolicy in-
terventions are channelled is consistent with several empirical results. In particular,
Murtin and de Serres (2014) apply an IV procedure to panel data from 11 OECD countries
observed since 1985 to disentangle the effects of policies on matching efﬁciency (i.e. our
parameterϕ) and job vacancy creation (i.e. our parameter c). Consistentwith our set of as-
sumptions, they ﬁnd that: i) more generous unemployment beneﬁts decrease matching
efﬁciency but haveno effect on vacancy creation (Table 4 Columns 3 and 4); ii) conversely,
tighter employment protection decreases vacancy creation but has no effect on matching
efﬁciency (Table 4 Columns 7 and 8); iii) the tax wedge has a strong negative impact on
vacancy creation (Tables 4 and 7). In some cases, the empirical results are more mixed.
For instance, Card et al. (2010) conclude in their meta-analysis of active labor market
programmes that “ training programmes are associated with positive medium-term im-
pacts, although in the short run they often appear ineffective.” This suggests a negative im-
pact of training on the job destruction rate thatmaterializes only in themid-term once the
unemployed has found another job, with little or no short-term effect due to improved
matching efﬁciency.
Please cite this article as: Murtin, F., Robin, J.-M., Labor market reforms a
10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.025evidence (e.g. Murtin and de Serres, 2014) that both unemployment
entry and exit rates decline with age. These socio-demographic
variables are assumed to have an impact on turnover parameters ϕ
and δ.4. Estimation procedure
The estimation is conducted in two steps. In the ﬁrst step,we estimate
a stationary version of the model that ﬁts the cyclical components of the
series of GDP, unemployment, job ﬁnding and job destruction rates, and
vacancies separately for the nine OECD countries. This will allow us to
test the ability of the heterogeneous-worker search-matching model to
ﬁt unemployment volatility well in all countries. In the second step, we
introduce LMPs into the empirical framework and we estimate their
impact on the structural parameters ϕ, δ and c by ﬁtting the raw series
(non detrended) of unemployment, turnover and vacancies jointly for
all nine countries.4.1. Assessing business-cycle dynamics
The estimation of the parameters controlling the short-term
response of the economy to business cycle shocks closely follows the
method in Robin (2011). We assume that HP-ﬁltered series follow the
model of this paper as in a stationary environment exempt from any
institutional change. Hence, we impose ϕ•k= δ•k= c•k=0 to each policy
variable (k≥1) and each country. Ten parameters remain to be estimated:
the country-speciﬁc vacancy creation cost c0, the exogenous layoff rate δ0,
the two parameters of the matching function (ϕ0,η), the leisure cost
parameter z, the three parameters of the distribution of worker heteroge-
neity (C, v, μ), and the two parameters of the latent productivity process
(ρ, σ). The number of aggregate states is set to N= 150, the number of
different ability types is taken equal toM= 500.
The business-cycle (BC) parameters θBC= (c0,δ0,ϕ0,η,z,C,ν,μ,ρ,σ) are
estimated using the Simulated Method of Moments, separately,
country by country. In practice, we simulate very long series at quarterly
frequency (T= 500 observations) of aggregate output, unemployment
rates, unemployment turnover and vacancies, and we search for the set
of parameters θBC that best matches the following 18 country-speciﬁc
moments: i) the mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation of
log-GDP; ii) the mean, standard deviation and kurtosis of log-
unemployment10; iii) the mean and the standard deviation of logged
job ﬁnding and job destruction rates, and market tightness; iv) four
output elasticities: unemployment, turnover rates and market tightness;
v) the elasticities of the job ﬁnding rate with respect to market tightness
and unemployment rate.
Once these structural parameters are estimated, we ﬁlter out the
series of aggregate shocks yt so as to minimize the sum of squared
residuals of log GDP. The parameters and the series of aggregate shocks
are then used to simulate the series of unemployment rates.10 Matching the kurtosis of time-series observations forces the simulated series to be
smooth.
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
12 If ﬁrms have less bargaining power, their ex-ante proﬁts are smaller; the free entry
Table 8
Reduced-form LMP effects on employment - actual and simulated.
Log UNR Log LDR Log JFR Log V Log tightness
Observed Simulated Obs. Simul. Obs. Simul. Obs. Simul. Obs. Simul.
Initial replacement rate 0.064 0.054 0.030 −0.005 −0.037 −0.053 −0.065 −0.003 −0.133 −0.057
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.003)
ALMP: Placement −0.095 −0.119 −0.069 −0.112 0.020 0.005 −0.012 −0.046 0.080 0.073
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002)
ALMP: Training −0.126 −0.104 −0.091 −0.077 −0.014 −0.029 −0.198 −0.049 −0.099 0.056
(0.016) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.042) (0.005) (0.044) (0.006)
ALMP: Incentives 0.013 −0.010 0.034 0.053 0.063 0.099 0.326 0.208 0.341 0.217
(0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.044) (0.005) (0.046) (0.007)
Product market regulation 0.045 0.063 −0.016 −0.021 −0.076 −0.084 −0.167 −0.126 −0.199 −0.189
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.028) (0.003) (0.030) (0.004)
Employment protection −0.047 −0.023 −0.078 −0.020 −0.042 0.008 −0.006 0.001 0.046 0.023
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002)
Tax wedge 0.082 0.027 0.037 −0.000 −0.051 −0.032 0.015 −0.056 −0.064 −0.083
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.019) (0.003)
Average years of higher education −0.074 −0.036 −0.069 −0.044 0.003 −0.010 −0.030 −0.015 0.045 0.021
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.019) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003)
Demographic share of 15–24 population 0.023 −0.028 0.013 −0.018 0.003 0.017 0.024 −0.004 −0.014 0.025
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.027) (0.003) (0.029) (0.004)
Demographic share of 55–64 population 0.002 −0.028 0.010 −0.040 −0.011 −0.027 −0.011 −0.017 −0.022 0.011
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003)
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In a second step, we introduce LMPs andwe estimate all parameters,
including the response to LMP shocks, by iterating the following
procedure:
1. Given parameters, ﬁlter aggregate shocks out by ﬁtting aggregate out-
put series (detrended) by least squares, separately, country by country;
2. Given aggregate shocks, estimate parameters by ﬁtting unemploy-
ment, turnover and vacancy series (actual, not detrended) by simulat-
ed least squares, weighing residual squares by the inverse variance of
each series. Contrary to the ﬁrst estimation, the estimation of policy
parameters is done jointly for all countries.
This estimation procedure is considerably easier to implement than
any other method, Bayesian or frequentist, for nonlinear state-space
models.
The economy is simulated assuming myopic expectations on policy
interventions. Whenever a policy variable Xk is changed, which only
happens infrequently, we recalculate the present values of unem-
ployment and of match surplus for all aggregate states,11 together
with the values of job ﬁnding and job destruction rate, and keep
them set to these levels until the next policy intervention.
We obtain standard errors for the estimates of LMP parameters as
follows. Rather than estimating the Jacobian matrix and using the
“sandwich” formula, which is numerically cumbersome and not very
reliable given the amount of numerical simulations involved,we instead
note that Eq. (1) implies that.
log f t−η logθt− log
X
m
ut mð Þ‘m1 St mð Þ≥0f g
ut
 !
− logϕ0 ¼
X
k
ϕk•X
k
nt :
We then compute standard errors for the parameters ϕ•k using the
standard OLS formula for the regression of the left-hand side variable on
LMP regressors. This calculation may severely overestimate the precision
of the estimation by neglecting estimation errors induced by using
parameter estimates instead of true values to predict the left hand
side. But it nevertheless provides useful information on how much the
simulated series are changed by a small perturbation of the policy11 Note that the present values do not depend on parameters ϕ and c. Thematch surplus
only changes with δ.
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based on Eqs. (2) and (3).5. The dynamics of cyclical unemployment
5.1. Parameter estimates
The results of the ﬁrst-stage estimation are reported in Table 3.
Productivity is more volatile in European countries than in Australia
and the US. Worker ability is less heterogeneous in Portugal and more
heterogeneous in Germany and Japan. It follows that the opportunity
cost of employment z is also higher in Portugal and lower in Japan and
Germany; otherwise, it does not differ much from 0.7, which is Hall
and Milgrom's (2008) calibration for the US. It is difﬁcult to compare
the estimates of the vacancy cost across countries, as they use different
ways of measuring vacancies. They are also not comparable with those
estimated or calibrated in the other studies (e.g. 0.36 in Pissarides, 2009,
0.43 in Hall and Milgrom, 2008, 0.58 in Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008),
which all use a Mortensen-Pissarides model with a non-zero bargaining
power for workers.12 Matching efﬁciency (ϕ) is higher in Australia and
Sweden and lower in France and Germany. The rate of exogenous job
destruction (δ) is higher in the United States, Australia and Spain, and
lower in Japan and Portugal. This inference is broadly in line with other
micro and macroeconomic evidence on job turnover rates (see Jolivet
et al., 2006; Elsby et al., 2012; Murtin et al., 2014).
Note that the elasticity of thematching functionwas arbitrarily ﬁxed
to 0.5 in all country-level estimations. Indeed, we could ﬁt all moments
well for any preset value of η. We explain this lack of identiﬁcation as
follows. The duration of unemployment is controlled by three com-
ponents: matching efﬁciency (ϕ), the meeting elasticity with respect
to market tightness (η) and worker employability (the sign of
the match surplus). It seems that the latter two components are not
separately identiﬁed. If one increases themeeting frequency as a function
of the number of created vacancies (η), one can cancel that effect by
recalibrating the fraction of workers at risk of unemployability (i.e. by
putting more mass in the left tail of the ability distribution).condition then delivers the observed number of vacancies in equilibrium only if the unit
cost of vacancy is also smaller. The bargaining power of unemployed workers is assumed
equal to zero mainly for analytical simplicity.
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Table 9
Assessing the impact of labor market reforms on unemployment.
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Mean Mean absolute
DiD
Correlation with
mean LMP change
Unemployment rate, average change (percentage point)
Actual −5.35 −2.15 −1.33 1.32 1.52 −12.16 1.94 −7.96 −2.62 −2.97
Simulated −3.55 −4.27 −2.46 2.75 −0.88 −15.90 1.86 −6.17 −1.19 −3.31
(Correlation between actual and simulated = 0.93)
“Diff-in-Diff” policy effects (percentage point)
Initial replacement rate −0.21 0.52 0.10 0.57 0.67 −3.19 −1.47 −1.30 −0.58 −0.54 0.96 0.94
ALMP: Placement −1.60 −1.05 −0.31 3.50 −0.27 −1.70 1.19 −2.86 0.11 −0.33 1.40 −0.94
ALMP: Training 0.00 0.04 −0.36 0.04 −0.16 −0.85 1.42 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.36 −0.91
ALMP: Incentives −0.04 −0.14 0.03 −0.01 −0.01 −0.41 0.94 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.20 −0.96
Product market regulation −0.61 −0.90 −1.23 −0.33 −0.65 −1.69 −0.51 −1.07 −0.18 −0.80 0.80 0.65
Employment protection −0.23 −0.09 −0.20 0.00 0.31 1.85 0.01 −0.10 0.00 0.17 0.31 −0.89
Tax wedge 0.00 0.15 0.31 0.45 0.67 −0.64 0.32 −0.37 0.27 0.13 0.35 0.86
Sum of individual policy effects −2.68 −1.48 −1.65 4.21 0.56 −6.62 1.91 −5.17 −0.26 −1.24 2.73
Policy mix (all reforms) −2.99 −1.95 −1.50 4.10 0.45 −5.65 2.30 −4.88 −0.30 −1.16 2.68
Notes: For each country we ﬁrst simulate unemployment over the 1985–2007 period responding to all observed LMP changes and estimated business cycle shocks. In a second step, we
simulate the series of unemployment after shutting down one LMP at a time (i.e. the LMP is frozen to its average value for the whole period). The table shows the difference between the
mean unemployment change across time estimated in the ﬁrst step and the mean unemployment change, LMP by LMP, estimated in the second step.
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Table 4 shows how themodelﬁts the 18moments used in estimation,
Table 5 reports the correlations between actual and simulatedHP-ﬁltered
series, and Fig. 3 plots the actual an d simulated unemployment cycles.
The ﬁt is generally good (at least for such a simple model). In particu-
lar, the model has no problem ﬁtting both the volatility of output and the
volatility of unemployment. The mechanism is simple to understand. In
good times, unemployment is low and stable and all separations follow
from exogenous shocks. When aggregate productivity falls, low-skilled
workers start losing their jobs because their match surplus becomes
negative. A thick left tail of the distribution of worker heterogeneity am-
pliﬁes the recessive effect of negative productivity shocks. If the recession
lasts, unemployment increases because low-ability workers remain
unemployed longer. When the economy recovers, previously unproduc-
tive workers become productive again, and they progressively start to
get back to work. The process of layoff and reemployment is dissymmet-
ric: all unproductive workers are immediately laid off, while all unem-
ployed, yet productive workers are not instantaneously reemployed.
The ﬁt of job ﬁnding rates is also good, with accurate estimates of
volatility. However, the elasticity of job ﬁnding rates with respect to
tightness (respectively to unemployment) is greatly over-estimated
(American resp. under-estimated). Although the correlation between
actual and predicted series of tightness is good (around 65%), we
generally greatly under-estimate its volatility. These two ﬁndingsTable 10
Share of unemployment variance explained by covariates.
AUS FRA DEU JAP
Pseudo-R2 of LMPs and business cycle (=1 - MSE) 0.78 0.62 0.47 0
Decomposition of pseudo-R2
Business cycle shocks 0.37 0.35 0.25 0
LMPs 0.42 0.26 0.21 0
Pseudo-R2 of speciﬁc LMPs
Initial replacement rate 0.046 0.019 −0.002 −0
ALMP placement 0.165 −0.024 0.088 0
ALMP training −0.014 0.014 0.115 −0
ALMP incentives 0.004 0.057 0.072 0
Product market regulation 0.062 0.185 0.093 0
Employment protection 0.079 −0.015 −0.028 0
Tax wedge 0.045 0.033 0.080 −0
Notes: The simulations are the same as for Table 9.We calculate themean squared error (MSE) o
parameters, unemployment, job ﬁnding and layoff rates, and tightness)with all LMPs and busin
shocks as 1 -MSE(LMP=0),whereMSE(LMP=0) is themean square error of themodelwith L
as MSE(LMP= 0) - MSE.
Please cite this article as: Murtin, F., Robin, J.-M., Labor market reforms a
10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.025(the excess sensitivity of the job ﬁnding rate to market tightness
and the under-estimation of the volatility of tightness) are related.
The response of vacancy creation to productivity shocks has to be
attenuated, or job ﬁnding rates would not be well ﬁtted. Additional
friction (such as the negative dependence of job ﬁnding rates to
unemployment duration) is therefore required to make the job ﬁnding
process more sluggish in recovery times.
Finally, the job destruction rate that is predicted by the model is too
uneven or jagged, and its correlation to actual series is poor. This may
happen again because the process of endogenous job destruction is
too lumpy. Following a negative productivity shocks, a mass of workers
is instantly laid off, and the job destruction rate is immediately after
reverted to the frictional rate of exogenous job destruction unless aggre-
gate productivity keeps going further down.
Wewill see in the next section that this apparent failure atﬁtting some
aspects of turnover and vacancies could be an artifact of detrending (using
the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter). If total output is clearly trended and easily
detrended, long-term trends in labor market variables are much more
difﬁcult to ﬁlter out. This is the reason why Shimer (2005), and his
followers, including us, used the HP ﬁlter with a smoothingparameter
of 105, much greater than the standard value of 1024 recommended for
quarterly series. Using 1024 yields a trend of unemployment that undu-
lates like a cycle. In the next section, we will argue that a better way of
handling trends in labor market variables is to model them by way of
intervention variables (policy or demographics).PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Mean Correlation with
std of LMP change
.78 0.49 0.65 0.88 0.75 0.37 0.61
.08 0.42 0.29 0.44 0.29 0.48 0.33
.70 0.08 0.36 0.44 0.46 −0.10 0.31
.035 0.042 0.028 0.046 0.047 0.031 0.025 0.25
.432 0.022 0.019 0.152 0.195 0.028 0.119 0.48
.004 −0.002 0.008 0.359 0.000 −0.020 0.051 0.95
.001 0.023 0.007 0.549 0.006 0.004 0.080 0.99
.088 −0.042 0.086 0.057 0.104 −0.007 0.070 0.39
.000 0.032 0.205 0.001 −0.004 0.000 0.030 0.88
.038 0.049 0.007 −0.002 0.019 −0.083 0.012 0.35
f the benchmarkmodel (i.e. the sumof squared errors for all the series used to estimate the
ess cycle shocks. The pseudo-R2 is 1 - MSE.We calculate the contribution of business cycle
MPs remainingﬁxed at their country-speciﬁcmeans. The contribution of LMPs is calculated
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
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6.1. Parameter estimates
The estimated policy parameters are reported in Table 6. LMP
variables are centered at their country-speciﬁc mean and standardized
by the cross-country and cross-time standard deviation of the LMP. Policy
parameters are thus semi-elasticities that quantify the relative increase in
parameters ϕ, δ, and c when LMPs are increased by one standard devia-
tion around the country-speciﬁc mean of the policy variable.
All the policy effects have the expected sign (when precisely
estimated). Large effects are recorded for ALMP-placement services and
training on job destruction rates, which we interpret as the result of im-
proved matching technology. Employment incentives and product mar-
ket deregulation also have a strong and positive effect on job creation.
The replacement rate, employment protection and the tax wedge also
have signiﬁcant effects, although of smaller magnitude (on ϕ, δ and c re-
spectively). The bottompart of Table 6 reports the estimated effects of ed-
ucation and demographic variables. Educational achievementmoderately
reduces the pace of job destruction, as an additional 0.4-year of higher ed-
ucation (one standard deviation) yields a 5.0% reduction in the job de-
struction rate.13 As expected, older (more experienced) workers tend to
remain unemployed longer, but face a lower layoff risk.6.2. Fitting the trends
Figs. 4–7 show how good the model is at predicting labor market
outcomes given productivity shocks and institutional change. Table 7
displays the correlations between actual and predicted series. Actual
and simulated unemployment rates are highly correlated for all coun-
tries, with an average correlation equal to 0.82. The best ﬁt is obtained
for Australia, Japan, Sweden and the UK with correlations close to or
above 0.90, while the model performs less well for the US with a corre-
lation of about 0.56.
The ﬁt of job destruction rates is greatly improved by comparison
to the cyclical estimation, as the correlation between predicted and
observed series jumps from 0.18 in the BC-model to 0.56 in the LMP-
model. The ﬁt of job ﬁnding rates, which are well predicted except for
Germany and Portugal, and the US to a lesser extent, has also improved.
Market tightness is well ﬁtted for all countries but the US and Portugal.
The only country for which the model fails the ﬁt test is the US. It
may be that by estimating LMP effects jointly we impose to the US labor
market a European norm that does not apply to the US. It may also be
that simulating the economy at the quarterly frequency does not work
well for the US, as very few workers remain unemployed longer than a
quarter. Yet, overall, these results suggest that LMPs help predict the
permanent shifts in unemployment and its turnover components well.
We ﬁnally ask whether the simulated series in Figs. 4–7 reproduce
the correlations with LMP variables that can be obtained by regressing
unemployment rates, layoff rates, job ﬁnding rates and vacancies or
tightness on LMPs. Table 8 shows the regression on actual data and on
simulated series. In general the ﬁt is good, showing that the three
channels of policy interventions match reasonably well the observable
impact of these policies on unemployment, layoff, job ﬁnding, vacancies
and tightness.14 We emphasize again that a unique structural effect of
LMPs on parameters ϕ,δ and c is assumed for all nine countries.13 For comparison, mean years of higher education have on average increased by
0.33 years over the period 1985–2007.
14 Note that the reduced forms conclude to a positive effect of employment protection on
unemployment, the layoff rate being reduced by more than the job ﬁnding rate is in-
creased. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) already made that conclusion.
Please cite this article as: Murtin, F., Robin, J.-M., Labor market reforms a
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In order to get a sense of the marginal effect of each policy on
unemployment, we calculate a “difference-in-differences” (DiD) treat-
ment effect for each LMP separately and all together as follows. First we
simulate for the period 1985–2007 the benchmark series of labor market
outcomes responding to the estimated series of aggregate productivity
shocks and to the observed series of LMP variables, which vary over
time. Then we run counterfactual simulations with one speciﬁc LMP
variable, say Z, remaining ﬁxed to its country-speciﬁc mean value, while
other LMPs are the time-varying observed ones, and we re-calculate the
average counterfactual unemployment change over the period. Finally,
for each country, we calculate DiD policy effects as the benchmark
mean unemployment change minus the counterfactual mean change.
The latter quantity reﬂects the effect of the variation in Z over the period.
In the last counterfactual simulation corresponding to the line at the
bottom of Table 9, all LMPs are frozen, so that the calculated average
unemployment change corresponds to the joint effect of all LMPs reforms.
Table 9 reports the results. Placement services, UI initial replacement
rate and product market regulation are the main intervention channels
by which countries signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced unemployment over the
period, these by all means classical policies being accountable for close
to one, or more than one percentage point reduction or augmentation
of unemployment.15 The other policies yielded, on average, only
between 20% and a third of a percentage point.
These average effects hide a variety of interventions across
countries, which we summarize as follows. Australia and France
increased expenditure on placement services and deregulated product
markets. Germany deregulated. Spain massively reduced unemployment
beneﬁts, deregulated and reduced employment protection. The UK
reduced unemployment beneﬁt, improved placement services and
deregulated. The only countries implementing unemployment-
augmenting policies are countries with low unemployment rates and
hit by a deep and long-lasting recession at the end of the eighties or the
beginning of the nineties. Thus Japan and Sweden massively reduced
ALMP expenditure. Lastly, Portugal and the USmade no noticeable classi-
cal policy intervention.
For each individual LMP, it is interesting to look at the cross-country
correlation between the average unemployment change and the LMP
change. If this correlation were equal to one, this would suggest that
the model is linear and that the elasticity of LMPs is identical across
countries. As a result, we ﬁnd that the correlation between unemploy-
ment changes and LMP changes is large but not always close to one,
which indicates that the model captures some nonlinearities and/or
heterogeneities that reduced forms tend to miss. We also do not ﬁnd
evidence of much policy complementarity, as the sum of individual
effects is similar in value to the DiD effect of the policymix. This ﬁnding
contradicts Bassanini and Duval (2009) and other authors.
Note that the correlation with LMP changes is large but not always
close to one, which indicates that the model capture some nonlinearities
that reduced forms tend to miss. We also do not ﬁnd evidence of much
policy complementarity, as the sum of individual effects is similar in
value to the DiD effect of the policy mix. This ﬁnding contradicts
Bassanini and Duval (2009), who report positive interaction effects on
the basis of reduced-form regressions. Finally, identical labor market re-
forms trigger unemployment responses proportional (in magnitude) to
the baseline unemployment value — high-unemployment countries
such as Spain or France witnessing larger unemployment reductions
than the other countries; and more intensive interventions yield propor-
tionally bigger effects (see the correlations in the last column of Table 9).
Next wemeasure the relative contribution of LMPs and business cycle
shocks to the long term variance of unemployment. In general, both15 Yet the effect of productmarket regulation on employment has not receivedmuch at-
tention. See Felbermayr and Prat (2011) for a recent exception.
nd unemployment dynamics, Labour Econ. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
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Japan, business cycle shocks do not explain much unemployment
volatility, and in Portugal and the US labor market policies seem to
have little impact. The lower panel of Table 10 analyzes the contributions
of each LMP separately. These results conﬁrm those reported in Table 9.
For Australia, Japan and the UK, the main and most effective policies
were placement services and product market deregulation; in Germany
and Sweden, it is a mix of all three ALMPs; in France product market
deregulation; and Spain reduced employment protection.
7. Conclusion
Wehave proposed a dynamic stochastic search-matchingmodel with
worker heterogeneous abilities and labor market policy interventions.
Worker heterogeneity makes the effect of negative productivity shocks
on unemployment highly nonlinear, and provides an ampliﬁcationmech-
anism solving the unemployment volatility puzzle. Policy interventions
shift structural parameters such as matching efﬁciency, exogenous job
destruction and vacancy cost, and have long term effects on unemploy-
ment. For all 9 OECD countries used in the analysis, the model displays
an impressive ﬁt of unemployment dynamics. The amount of resources
injected into placement and employment services, the reduction of UI
beneﬁts and product market deregulation stand out as the most promi-
nent policy levers for unemployment reduction. All other LMPs have a
signiﬁcant but lesser impact. We also ﬁnd that business cycle shocks
and LMPs explain about the same share of unemployment volatility
(except for Japan, Portugal and the US).
Our model ﬁts labor outcome series well with the exception of the
US. This seems to indicate that European and US labor markets differ
in a fundamental way. It would be interesting for future work to collect
series at the state level and estimate a speciﬁc version of the model for
the US. It is thus likely that different policies, or the same policies but
with different elasticities, explain different unemployment dynamics
across US states.
Our model is both simple and ﬂexible. Yet, in its present form, it
remains too simple, and not ﬂexible enough to adequately capture all
aspects of labor market institutions. For example, speciﬁc legal aspects
of employment protection may make difﬁcult for ﬁrms to lay-off
workers even if their match surplus is negative. Another important
operating mechanism is search intensity, which is not explicitly modeled
here (only through an exogenous change in matching efﬁciency).
Moreover, unemployment beneﬁts are always paid for a ﬁxed period
of time, thus introducing state dependence in search intensity. Another
possible extension relates to labor market non participation.
Appendix A. Labour market reforms and unemployment dynamics
By Fabrice Murtin and Jean-Marc Robin
This companion appendix provides further details on data construc-
tion and estimations not reported in the main paper.
A.1. Construction of unemployment ﬂow data
Wecollect data onunemploymentﬂows fromvarious sources, namely
Robin (2011); Murtin et al. (2014); Eurostat (2011); OECD Employment
Outlook (2010) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008). Our constructed
series are systematically compared with those by Elsby et al. (2013).
Unemployment ﬂow series are based on unemployment duration
data, which exists only on an annual basis for most countries before the
mid-1990s, and on a quarterly basis afterwards. We select quarterly data
when they are available, otherwise we take annual data assuming con-
stant ﬂowswithin each year. Next ﬁgures show that, within each country,
annual and quarterly series are always consistent with each other.
Besides, unemployment duration data generally describe the stock
of unemployedworkers for several durations of unemployment, namely
less than 1 month, less than 3months, less than 6months and less thanPlease cite this article as: Murtin, F., Robin, J.-M., Labor market reforms a
10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.025one year. Instantaneous entry and exit rates from/to unemployment can
be calculated using any of the latter durations as a benchmark. In some
countries, the choice of a given duration matters as outﬂow rates vary
with the time spent in unemployment: There is negative duration de-
pendence or “hysteresis effects”. Following common practice applied
in other studies (e.g. Elsby et al., 2013), one selects a benchmark dura-
tion of 1month in countries that display duration dependence. This con-
cerns Australia, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Then, quarterly probabilities are recovered from monthly series
by using a probabilistic tree. For other countries with stable turnover
rates and no duration dependence, quarterly series are used directly
to minimize measurement errors.
Finally, unemployment turnover is commonly described by two dif-
ferent types of series: Instantaneous hazard rates arising from a time-
continuous framework, and entry and exit probabilities observed at a
discrete frequency. We focus on the second type of variable and de-
scribe quarterly unemployment entry and exit probabilities. Our
sources for ﬂow data are the following:
Australia:Weuse annual series fromMurtin et al. (2014) until 1997
then OECD Employment Outlook (2010) quarterly series.
France:Weuse annual series fromMurtin et al. (2014) until 2003Q1
then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series.
Germany:Weuse annual series fromMurtin et al. (2014) until 2005
then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series.
Japan:We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014).
Portugal:We use annual series fromMurtin et al. (2014) until 1998
then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series.
Spain: We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 1998
then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series.
Sweden:We use annual series fromMurtin et al. (2014) until 2004,
impose inﬂow and outﬂow rates equal to their corresponding 2004
values in 2005, then select Eurostat (2011) quarterly series from
2006Q1 onwards.
United Kingdom: We use quarterly series from Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2008) based on job claimants until 1987Q4, then annual
series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 1999Q2 and ﬁnally Eurostat
(2011) quarterly series.
United States:We use Robin (2011) quarterly series.
A.2. Other series
OECD (2011) database is used for the quarterly unemployment rate.
Quarterly series of job vacancies are borrowed from OECD (2011);
Eurostat (2011) and Robin (2011).
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